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Statutory Post-Judgment Interest: The Effect of
Legislative Changes After Judgment and
Suggestions for Construction
Post-judgment1 interest did not exist at common law and
is solely a matter of legislative grace.2 For the most part,
states3 have enacted statutes allowing for an award of interest
on money judgments to compensate the judgment creditor for
not having use of the judgment money (i.e. during the appeals
process) until paid by the judgment debtor.* Such statutes
have generally set the rate of interest that is applied to the
judgment debt until it is paid in full.
From time to time, legislatures find it necessary to change
the set statutory rate of interest for post-judgment debts to
keep in line with current economic conditions. These changes,
.~
though necessary, have resulted in a wealth of l i t i g a t i ~ nPrimarily, such a change raises the question whether the new rate
is to apply retroactively t o all judgments, prospectively t o outstanding amounts owed on prior judgments, or only to judgments rendered after the new rate's effective date.
Part I1 of this comment compares the approaches taken by
the courts when interpreting post-judgment interest statutes in
light of a change in the rate following entry of judgment. Part
I11 discusses the purposes and language of various post-judgment interest rate statutes and suggests ways in which leg-

1. Spellings of this word are a s varied as the statutes and cases which discuss it.
2. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840 (1990)
("At common law, judgments do not bear interest; interest rests solely upon statutory provision." (citations omitted)).
3. The federal government has also provided for post-judgment interest. See
28 U.S.C. $ 1961 (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of post-judgment interest
in federal courts, see Susan M. Payor, Post-Judgment Interest in Federal Courts, 37
EMORYL.J. 495 (1988).
4. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.CODE $ 685.010 (West 1987) ("on the principal
amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735,
para. 5/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992) ("until satisfied").
5 . See generally Diane M . Allen, Annotation, Retrospective Application and
Effect of State Statute or Rule Allowing Interest or Changing Rate of Interest on
Judgments or Verdicts, 41 A.L.Rdth 694 (1985).
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islatures can effectuate rate changes while preventing litigation
on the issue. Part IV examines Utah's recent change in the
post-judgment interest rate to illustrate how current judicial
doctrines are applied to determine the effect of a statutory rate
change on existing judgments. This comment concludes that for
most states, more careful statutory drafting would better effectuate the purposes of post-judgment interest and eliminate
most if not all litigation over this issue.
11. THE JUDICIALDEBATE:INTERPRETING
THE STATUTES

A. The Plain Language Test
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a court
should give effect to the plain language of the statute. Determining the applicable rate of interest is an easy question if the
language of the statute clearly states what rate applies to judgments entered during a specific period of time or indicates
whether or not the new rate is t o apply to existing judgments
or only t o judgments entered after the date of the amendment.
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court found the following
statutory language plain: "The interest rate provided in sec. 1
of this Act applies only to those judgments rendered after the
effective date of this
Courts have found that certain phrases plainly indicate an
intent t o apply the statute only to future judgments. For instance, in Puget Sound National Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,' the Court of Appeals of Washington held
that the phrase "from the date of entry thereof" clearly established the legislature's intent that the statute apply only prospectively. The court found "[tlhe language of the act . . . clear.
By providing that the interest rate as amended will apply to a
judgment 'from the date of entry thereof,' the legislature manifested an intent that the new interest rate apply only to judgments entered after the act's effective date."8
6. ALASKASTAT. 09.30.070 (1980), cited in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Anderson, 669 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1983); see also In re Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811,
816 n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) ("This Act is effective January 1, 1981 and shall not
apply to judgments rendered or decrees entered of record before that date."); Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Trinity Portland Cement Div., Gen. Portland Cement Co.,
563 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978) ("[Tlhe provision in the amended statute that
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of nine percent from and aRer the date
of the judgment, plainly suggests that the rate shall be applied prospectively only."
(citation omitted)).
7. 645 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
8. Id.; see also Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Kan. 1972) (The
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Additionally, in Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire
Corp.: the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the
words "enrolled or entered" established that the 'legislative
intent, as shown by the clear language of the statute, was t o
apply the new interest rate to judgments entered before the
effective date of the amendment which remain outstanding on
that date."1°
Very broad language which applies to all judgments without limit has also been interpreted by courts as a plain indication that the statute applies t o outstanding as well as future
judgments. For example, in Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v.
Central Rigging & Contracting Corp.," the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "[slince the statute literally extends
t o 'all judgments in this state,' and [because] there are strong
policy reasons for applying the same," the plaintiff was entitled
t o post-judgment interest at an increased rate from the effective date of amendment.'"
Clear statutory language will go a long way toward reducing litigation which results from changes in post-judgment
interest statutes. Absent such clear language, however, courts
must engage in further analysis t o determine legislative intent
regarding a rate change.

B. To Be or Not To Be Applied Retroactively (First Prong)
As a general rule, when the statutory language is not
clear, courts have followed a two-pronged approach to determine if and when a newly amended post-judgment interest
statute applies to an existing judgment. First, a court will address whether the rate change should be applied retroactively
t o the existing judgment from the judgment date. If not, the
court will next consider whether the new rate applies prospectively from its effective date to amounts still owed on existing
judgments. Although not all courts considering this issue have
applied both prongs, those that have considered only one of the
two prongs have either implicitly or explicitly assumed the
answer to the other.

language "from the day on which they are rendered [suggests that the statute
should] be applied prospectively only.").
9. 303 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 1983).
10. Id. at 861.
11. 684 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 1389.
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1. General principles of statutory construction
When the plain language of the statute does not offer any
clear direction to the court, further analysis is necessary to determine whether a newly amended post-judgment interest
statute applies retroactively to judgments entered prior to the
effective date of the amendment. The general rule for amended
statutes is that they do not apply retroactively absent clear
legislative intent.13 A typical example comes from South Carolina. In considering what application to give t o a recently
amended post-judgment interest statute, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held, "The presumption is [that] statutory enactments are prospective absent clear legislative intent or specific provision t o the contrary; however, a remedial or procedural statute is generally held to be retroactive."14 In a number of
states, this presumption has its origin in the state constitution
or statutes.15 Under this approach, determining the retroactive effect of a new statute or amendment providing for postjudgment interest requires the court to determine whether the
statute fits within the exception for "procedural" statutes having no substantive effect on the rights of either party.
2. The procedural /remedial exception
Each state which has addressed the question of whether a
statutory provision for post-judgment interest is substantive or
procedural has determined that such statutes are substantive
in nature and should not be applied retroactively to pre-existing judgments? The Georgia Court of Appeals has offered a

13. A number of states require not only clear legislative intent for retroactive
application, but also that the statute be procedural and not affect the substantive
rights of any party. Discussion of the procedural exception is reserved for the next
section. See infra part II.B.2.
14. Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 860, 861
(S.C. 1983) (citation omitted).
15. See, e.g., Mo. CONST.art. I, § 13.
16. See, eg., McKeague v. Talbert, 658 P.2d 898, 909 n.11 (Haw. Ct. App.
1983) (In dicta, the court states: "The rule swims against the current of the general rule against retroactivity. Also, we do not think that once a judgment is entered and interest awarded a subsequent amendment in the statutory interest rate
on judgments can be applied retroactively." (citations omitted)); Bartlett v.
Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Kan. 1972) ("A settled principle of statutory construction requires that statutes be given prospective operation only, unless contrary
legislative intent is expressed clearly, or necessarily implied from the language
used." (citation omitted)); Shelist v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 215 N.E.2d 748,
751 (Mass. 1966) ("A change in the rate of interest would affect the substantive
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reason why applying a statute amending the post-judgment
interest rate retroactively should not be allowed: "The law of
this State is that 'unless a statute either expressly or by necessary implication, shows that the General Assembly intended
that it operate retroactively, it will be given only prospective
appli~ation.'"'~The court continued: "[Tlo the extent that [construing an amending statute to have a retroactive effect on
existing judgments] would cast doubt and uncertainty upon the
rights and liabilities of the parties as fixed by judgments under
the law as it existed prior to [the effective date of the amendment], it would violate the principle of finality of judgments."18
In summary, absent clear statutory language expressing
the desire to apply the statute retroactively to judgments already in existence, or case law in a particular jurisdiction indicating that statutes providing for interest are procedural rather
than substantive, it is unlikely that a court would hold that a n
amended statute providing for post-judgment interest should be
applied retroactively.
C. Prospective Application From Effective Date (Second
Prong)
Although no court has been willing, absent clear statutory
language, to apply from the date of judgment a new post-judgment interest rate to previously entered judgments, many

rights of the parties as of the time of the taking." (citation omitted)); White v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("A statute shall
not be applied retrospectively except where the legislature manifests a clear intent
that it do so and where the statute is procedural only and does not effect [sic] any
substantive right of the parties. The present statute does not meet the exception
and shall not be applied retrospectively." (citation omitted)); People a rel. Atlantic,
Gulf & Pac. Co. v. Miller, 17 N.Y.S.2d 202, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ("The statute with
which we are here concerned contains no express language indicating it is to have
retroactive operation. Therefore its effect must be deemed prospective only." (citations omitted)); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329,
346 (Okla. 1970) ("A settled principal [sic] of statutory construction requires statutes be given prospective operation only, unless contrary legislative intent is expressed clearly, or necessarily implied from the language used."); Southeastern
Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 860, 861 (S.C. 1983) ("The presumption is statutory enactments are prospective absent clear legislative intent or
specific provision to the contrary; however, a remedial or procedural statute is
generally held to be retroactive." (citation omitted)).
17. Department of Tramp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d 104, 106
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Anthony v. P ~ M ,92 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 1956)).
18. Id. at 107.
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courts have been persuaded to apply the new interest rate to
amounts owed on existing judgments, beginning from the
amendment's effective date. Many courts hold that this is a
prospective rather than a retroactive application of the new
statute. The courts have viewed the issue as whether a judgment and the accompanying interest rate, once rendered, together create a vested contract or property right in a party, or
whether the interest is simply statutory and thus subject to
change or extinguishment a t the will of the legislature that
gave it life.
In Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway
Co.,lg the United States Supreme Court held that a cause of
action based on a tort or on a contract which did not prescribe
a rate of interest was not a contract in the ordinary sense when
merged into a judgment. Rather, whether interest accrues upon
a judgment is a matter of legislative d i s ~ r e t i o n .The
~ ~ Court
concluded that a legislature
is free, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, to provide for interest as a penalty or liquidated damages for the non-payment of the judgment, or not to do so.
When such provision is made by statute, the owner of the
judgment is, of course, entitled to the interest so prescribed
until payment is received, or until the State shall, in the
exercise of its discretion, declare that such interest shall be
changed or cease to accrue. Should the statutory damages for
non-payment of a judgment be determined by a State, either
in whole or in part, the owner of a judgment will be entitled
t o receive and have a vested right in the damages which shall
have accrued up to the date of the legislative change; but
after that time his rights as to interest as damages are, as
when he first obtained his judgment, just what the legislature
chooses to declare. He has no contract whatever on the subject with the defendant in the judgment, and his right is t o
receive, and the defendant's obligation is to pay, a s damages,
just what the State chooses t o pre~cribe.~'

19. 146 U.S. 162 (1892).
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id. at 168-69. Within a year, the Supreme Court decided a similar case
based on Texas law. The judgment involved had been entered at a time when the
statute provided for 8% interest on judgments. Later, the statute was amended to
provide for 6% interest on judgments. Without mentioning Morley, the Court held
that "interest was properly included at the rate which obtained under the law of
Texas at the time judgment was rendered, the change in the law in that respect
operating only prospectively." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Anderson, 149 U S . 237, 242
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Justice Harlan dissented, taking the position that rights once
acquired by legislative enactment cannot be destroyed by subsequent enactment because the judgment is a property right
which cannot be infringed by the legislature without due process of
Subsequently, the Supreme Court followed the Morley
majority's rationale in Missouri & Arkansas Lumber & Mining
Co. u. Greenwood District of Se bastian County, A r k a n ~ a s . ~ ~
Quoting extensively from Morley, the Court held that the right
to post-judgment interest is based on public policy concerns and
is completely "outside the sphere of private contracts."24 The
majority of the states addressing this issue have followed

(1893).
22. Morley, 146 US. a t 173-78.
23. 249 U.S. 170 (1919).
24. Id. at 173. For another federal case holding similarly, see Shook &
Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383,
1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (post-judgment rate of interest under old statute is a "creature of statute, not contract" and thus may be changed by the legislature, where
new rate applied from statute's effective date). See also Glades County v. Kurtz,
101 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir. 1939):
The rate thus determined was not contractual, and the power of the state
to change or modify it was neither exhausted by the rendition of the
judgment nor restricted by constitutional limitations. . . . I n the sense
that it is a contract, the provision of the judgment, whether expressed or
implied, providing for payment of interest is an expression of the sovereign will, supplying whatever may be lacking in mutual consent. When,
because of changing conditions, the will relaxes and substitutes a new
and different provision, it modifies or impairs no contract that the parties
have made.
Id. (citations omitted).
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M ~ r l e y Noe
. ~ ~ v. City of ~ h i c a g o ' illustrates
~
a typical holding and rationale. There the Illinois Supreme Court held,
Interest was not allowed a t common law, but is solely the
creature of the statute, and can only be recovered according to
its terms. The rights of the parties in respect to interest were
not governed by contract, but by statute, which might be
changed a t any time, in the pleasure of the legislature, without impairing any contract, or affecting any vested right.27

Finally, the court found "unrealistic" arguments that a judgment and its interest are contractual in nature.28
In spite of the view expressed in Morley, a minority of
states have held that the rights and liabilities of the parties
are fixed by the judgment under the law as it existed a t the
time the judgment was rendered and that the amended rate
applies only to judgments entered after amendment.2gFor ex25. See, e.g., McBride v. Superior Court, 635 P.2d 178, 179 (Ariz. 1981) ("[Wle
do not believe that a judgment is a contractual obligation. Judgments are the result of the operation of the law. They are seldom based upon mutuality of the
parties."); Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 37 P.2d 407,
412 (Idaho 1934) ("Interest upon a judgment is not a matter of contract, but is
wholly statutory. A judgment can bear interest a t such a rate only as the law provides."); Puget Sound Nat'l. Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d
1122, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ( W e recognize that a legislative body may provide that a new interest rate will apply to existing judgments a s well as those
entered after the act's effective date, the right to such interest being not contractual but a matter of legislative discretion."); see also Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d
1314, 1319 (Kan. 1972) (Prager, J., dissenting) (arguing that judgments are not a
matter of contract but a n obligation implied or imposed by law); Ridge v. Ridge,
572 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1978); Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 449 A.2d 406,
409 (Md. 1982); Senn v. Commerce-Manchester Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551, 553-54 (Mo.
1980); White v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
26. 307 N.E.2d 376 (Iil. 1974).
27. Id. a t 379 (citation omitted).
28. Id. ("[Wle consider that the holdings that a judgment is a contract or in
the nature of a contract are forced and unrealistic. To be preferred are the holdings that interest on a judgment arises from a statute's operation and not from
any contract or other agreement of the parties.").
29. See, eg., Department of Transp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d
104, 106-07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). See also Butler v. Rockwell, 29 P. 458, 460 (Colo.
1892):
I t is unquestionably true that a judgment partakes of the nature of a
contract sufficiently to supersede the original contract or cause of action,
both as to principal and interest. The original contract or cause of action
becomes merged, and the judgment constitutes a new and liquidated debt.
This debt, and the liability for interest thereon as provided by statute a t
the date of the judgment, are obligations binding upon the debtor till the
judgment is reversed or satisfied.
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ample, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that "the rights of
the parties as embodied in a judgment, including the rate of
interest after judgment, are not changed by a subsequent
change in the law."30
AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
111. LEGISLATION

A. The Purpose of Post-Judgment Interest
There are two discernible purposes for post-judgment interest: 1) compensation to the judgment creditor for not having
use of the money owed; and 2) punishment of the judgment
debtor to encourage him o r her t o pay the judgment without
undue delay.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[ilnterest is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the
parties, for the use or forbearance of money, o r as damages for
The majority of courts which have discussed
its detenti~n."~'
the purpose of post-judgment interest statutes have echoed this
principle." For example, the highest court of Maryland, in
interpreting that state's post-judgment interest statute, explained that the "purpose of postjudgment interest is to com-

Id. (citations omitted).
30. Sammons Enters. v. Manley, 554 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
aff'd, Manley v. Sammons Enters., 563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978).
31. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1872).
32. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Ark. 1978)
("The purpose of interest on judgments is to compensate the judgment creditor for
the fact that he has not had the use of . . . money that has been adjudged to be
his."), aff'd sub nom. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 3 1 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., 837 P.2d 1273, 1296-97
(Haw. 1992) ("Post-judgment interest on prejudgment interest [would be] a windfall
to plaintiff under [this section,] and, as such, [would be] more punitive than compensatory."), modified, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 786 P.2d
583, 585 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) ("The apparent policy of this statute is to insure
that a prevailing party will receive all the rights and benefits of a money judgment when it is due."); Farmer v. Stubblefield, 180 S.W.2d 405, 405 (Ky. Ct. App.
1944) ("At common law judgments did not bear interest and the purpose of the
statute was to . . . insure compensation to the creditor for the loss of the use of
his money during the period in which he was wrongfully deprived of it."); Beneficial Discount Co. v. Spike, 398 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (Statutes providing that money judgments are to "bear interest from date of entry [at rate of 6%
indicate] that interest on a judgment represents damages recoverable by the judgment creditor for the non-payment or detention of monies due and owing on [a]
judgment" against a judgment debtor.); Adarns v. Nissan Motor Corp., 387 S.E.2d
288, 295 (W. Va. 1989) ("legislature intended that post-judgment interest be
available to compensate an individual for the delay between the judgment and the
receipt of actual payment").
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pensate the judgment creditor for the loss of the monies that
are due and owing to him from the time the judgment is entered until it is paid."33 Referring to the statutory amendment
which increased the post-judgment interest rate, the court held
that "[tlhe change in the interest rate, from six to 10 percent
per annum, recognized that the old rate no longer fairly compensated judgment ~ r e d i t o r s . " ~ ~
The Eleventh Circuit used similar language when forecasting what the Georgia Supreme Court would hold if it were to
decide what effect an amendment in Georgia's post-judgment
statute would have on a prior judgment. The court found "substantial policy grounds for giving the statute literal effect. The
purpose for increasing the rate of interest accruing to judgments was to acknowledge an increase in interes't rates in
general and to bring the rate of interest on judgments into
parity with other comparable market rates of intere~t."~'
Judicial decisions in very few states have viewed post-judgment interest as a measure designed to punish the judgment
debtor for not paying the amount of the judgment.36 As a result, the remainder of this comment will assume that the purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the judgment
creditor for loss of use of the judgment debt.

B. Post-Judgment Interest Rate Statutes
States have chosen a variety of methods of setting their
post-judgment interest rate, ranging from the simple to the
sophisticated. Many states set the interest rate at a specific
percentage in the statute itself.37 For example, the relevant
Illinois statute provides that "Lj]udgments recovered in any

33. Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 449 A.2d 406, 409 @Id. 1982).
34. Id.
35. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp.,
684 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982).
36. See Courtenay v. Wilhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) ("The
statute's function is to encourage a judgment debtor to timely comply with the
terms of the judgment" and in the case of a separation agreement incorporated in
a divorce decree, to encourage fulfillment of the obligations incurred in the agreement.); Herring v. Golden State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) ("The statute referred to by plaintiff is in the nature of a penalty to be
assessed against insurers for dilatory practices in settling meritorious claims . . . .
Such statutes, having a punitive purpose, are never given retroactive effect." (citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., AM. CODE$ 8-8-10 (1993); ARK. CODEANN. $ 16-65-114 (Michie
1987); MONT. CODEANN. $ 25-9-205 (1993). See generally Appendix 1.
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court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the
date of the judgment until ~atisfied."~'
Other states do not provide for a specific post-judgment
interest rate, but tie the rate to some sort of index or standardized market rate. Minnesota, for example, provides that the
rate of interest on a judgment "shall be based on the secondary
market yield of one year United States treasury bills."39 Texas
computes the post-judgment rate "by taking the auction rate
quoted on a discount basis for 52-week treasury bills issued by
the United States government as published by the Federal
Reserve Board on the most recent date preceding the date of
comp~tation.'"~This rate is limited, however, to a minimum
of 10% and a maximum of 20%.41
Many states use a combination: an index or market rate
plus a set percentageO4' For example, color ad^^^ and Delaware44 add 2% and 5%, respectively, to the Federal Discount
Rate. Nevada adds 2% to the prime rate a t the largest bank in
the state of N e ~ a d a : ~while the District of Columbia's rate is
"70 percent of the rate of interest set by the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to section 6621 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986."~~
A few states allow for a different rate than that specified
by statute to be applied by the judge if circumstances warrant.47 Two states simply leave the rate of interest to be applied to judgments t o the discretion of the judiciary. Mississippi
law provides that "judgments or decrees shall bear interest at a
per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a
date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior
to the filing of the complaint.'"' In New Jersey, the interest
38. ILL. ANN. STAT.ch. 735, para. 5/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
39. MINN. STAT.ANN. § 549.09 (West Supp. 1994).
40. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (West Supp. 1994).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., COLO. REV.STAT. 13-21-101 (1987) (discount rate plus 2% per
year); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 45-103 (1988) (T-bill rate plus 1%); UTAH CODEANN.
§ 15-1-4 (Supp. 1994) (federal post-judgment interest rate plus 2%); see generally
Appendix 1.
43. COLO. REV. STAT.$ 13-21-101 (1987).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 5 2301 (1993).
45. NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. § 17.130 (Michie 1993).
46. D.C. CODEANN. 8 28-3302 (1991).
47. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 360.040 (MichieBobbs-Merrill 1987)
("judgment may bear less interest . . . if the court rendering such judgment, after
a hearing on that question, is satisfied that the rate of interest should be less*).
48. MISS. CODEANN. 75-17-7 (1972).
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rates on judgments are established by the New Jersey Supreme
Court and set forth in the New Jersey court rules.49

C. Changes in Rates
When a legislature selects a method for establishing the
post-judgment interest rate, it also selects the method for adjusting that rate to reflect market interest rate changes. Where
a statute provides for a set interest rate, the legislature must
amend the statute to change the rate. While this method leaves
all control in the hands of the legislative body, it also takes a
great deal of time and effort, and legislatures are frequently
slow to react to changes in market interest rates.50
For this reason, many states have changed from a statutorily set rate to a rate based on an index or other measure of
current market rates. Interest rates based on these indices
allow the rate to track market rates without requiring repeated
action by the legislature.
Legislatures which leave the rate of interest to the discretion of the judge, or to the judiciary via court rules, have chosen to give the power both to set and to change post-judgment
interest rates to nonlegislative bodies. While this approach
allows for quicker changes and arguably more equitable results, it is unclear whether it does a better or worse job of effectuating the compensatory purpose of post-judgment interest.
D. Toward a Better Statute
The best type of statutory provision for post-judgment
interest is one that gives effect to the purpose of post-judgment
interest. If the purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the judgment creditor for the time during which he or she
does not have use of the money, then statutes which provide a
rate of interest nearest the market rate while avoiding litigation best fulfill that purpose. Statutes specifying a set percentage interest rate fail to achieve this result. These types of statutes are generally at or near market interest rates only ai the
time they are created or amended. Thus, absent an amendment
49. N.J. STAT.ANN. EJ 58:lOA-24.6 (West 1992); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11.
50. Today, when interest rates are as low as 6% and 7%, it is unreasonable
for a judgment debtor to be required to pay post-judgment interest a t rates of 10%
in states like Tennessee, Wyoming, Arizona, and Montana, and 12% in South Dakota, Vermont, Alabama, and Rhode Island. For a complete list of each state's
post-judgment interest rate, see Appendix 1.
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every six or twelve months, either the judgment creditor or
judgment debtor is disadvantaged during the appeals process
because of the disparity between the statutory and the market
rates.
In addition, fixed-rate statutes are the most likely to result
in litigation when a change in the rate is made. Litigation i n
turn results in prolonging the payment of interest and subjecting the rate applied to uncertainty. A change in a fixed-rate
statute inevitabily results in one party seeking to apply the
new rate to the judgment debt and the other party wanting to
apply the old rate to the judgment. Furthermore, most amendments simply change the numeric rate without providing clear
direction to courts or litigants when the new rate is to apply.
Some legislatures have addressed this problem by including
express language explaining which judgments the amended
rate applies to. This modification is helpful. Other states simply amend the statute to list each rate ever used, along with
the time period during which each rate applied, so that a judgment rendered during a particular period must bear the corre'
these modifications responding rate of i n t e r e ~ t . ~Although
sult in less confusion about which rate applies to a judgment,
they are unfair to the judgment debtor or creditor unless they
expressly provide for the new rate to apply to outstanding judgments as of the date the statute takes effect. As a result, they
do not give effect to the purpose of the statute.
Statutes which tie the rate of post-judgment interest to a n
index come much closer to giving effect to the compensatory
purpose of post-judgment interest provisions. These statutes
inherently have the effect of establishing a post-judgment interest rate very near the current market rate, a t least a t the time
the judgment is rendered? Their flaw, however, is that once
the judgment is rendered, the rate of interest is fixed and then
applies during the entire time the judgment is outstanding.
Because the appeals process can take years and market rates
of interest have shown a tendency to have wide fluctuations i n
short periods of time, the purpose of the statuteadequately

51. See, e.g., LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 1994).
52. Those statutes which add a fured percentage to an index rate are simply
providing for the f a d that the index is generally that of very low risk investments
and the additional percentage increase anticipates the possibility that the judgment
debtor could have invested the judgment money in higher yielding securities.
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compensating the judgment creditor-is not effectuated as time
passes and market rates change.
Specific provisions should be included in post-judgment
interest legislation which seeks to compensate the judgment
creditor via interest on unpaid judgment debt. The actual rate
provided for in the statute should be measured or based on an
index which accurately reflects market interest rates on the
date of the judgment. In addition, the statute should expressly
provide for the rate on the outstanding judgment amount to
change periodically. Thus, the outstanding judgment b e h s
interest at the market rate over the entire period until payment is complete, and not just for the first few months until
the market rate changes.
A good post-judgment interest statute will also expressly
state the date upon which the statute will go into effect, as well
a s whether it applies t o all judgments, including outstanding
judgments, or only to judgments entered after its effective date.
This provision will discourage potential litigation on the retroactivity issue.
Nevada's post-judgment interest statute fulfills the purpose
of allowing for post-judgment interest. The rate is equal to "the
prime rate at the largest bank in Nevada as ascertained by the
commissioner of financial institutions on January 1 or July 1,
as the case may be, immediately preceding the date of judgment, plus 2 per~ent."~
The use of the prime rate at the largest bank in the state guarantees that the rate applied is the
market rate for the state, regardless of rates prevailing in other states or set by the federal government via its sale of government securities.
The Nevada statute goes even further, providing that "[tlhe
rate must be adjusted accordingly on each January 1 and July
1 thereafter until the judgment is satisfied."54 This provision
guarantees that the rate on an outstanding judgment stays in
line with Nevada market interest rates. Thus, the judgment
creditor is compensated properly even if the market rates fluctuate after the date of judgment.
Finally, the Nevada legislature expressly provided, "The
provisions of this act apply only to causes of action which arise
on or after July 1, 1987."~~
Thus, litigation over when the
53. NEV.REV. STAT.A m . § 17.130 (Michie 1993).
54. Id.
55. 1987 NEV.STAT. ch. 413, $ 8.
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change became effective was eliminated by the express language of the amendment. A model post-judgment interest statute, based on the principles discussed in this section and the
Nevada statute, is included as Appendix 2.

IV. AN APPLICATION:
UTAH'SCHANGE
IN POST-JUDGMENT
INTEREST
Effective May 3, 1993, Senate Bill Number 279 amended
Utah Code $ 15-1-4, changing the interest rate on judgments
other than those rendered on contracts to "bear interest a t the
federal post-judgment interest rate as of January 1 of each
year, plus 2%."56 The federal post-judgment interest rate is
based on the rate of one-year U.S. Treasury bills.57 On January 1, 1993, this rate was 3.72%." Thus, under the amended
Utah statute, the rate of interest for the year 1993 for judgments, other than those rendered on contracts, was 5.72%. The
statute makes no specific provision regarding the application of
the new rate t o existing judgments.
Prior t o the amendment, the noncontract judgment interest
rate was 12%.~' For example, on a hypothetical judgment of
$1,000,000, the annual difference in post-judgment interest
would be $62,800. It is clear that the difference between the
Thus, it would clearly be in
two interest rates is signifi~ant.~'
56. 1993 Utah Laws 279. The full text of the amended statute reads as follows:
15-14. INTEREST
ON JIJDGMENTS.
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the
contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment.
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest a t the federal postjudgment
interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate established for the federal court system under 28 U,S.C Sec. 1961, a s amended.

Id.
57. This rate is "[c]alculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a
rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fAy-two
week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the
judgment." 28 U.S.C.A. 8 1961 (West Supp. 1994).
58. See "52-Week T-Bill Rate Table Of Changes," distributed to Federal
Courts.
59. UTAHCODEANN. 5 15-1-4 (1992).
60. A $1 million judgment at 12% results in $120,000 per year in interest,
while the same judgment a t 5.72% results in $57,200 per year, a difference of
$62,800 per year, or about $172 per day.
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the best interest of the judgment debtor to argue in favor of
applying the new lower rate and the judgment creditor to argue
for applying the old higher rate in effect on the day of the judgment. Litigation will be the result.
In determining the retroactivity of the amended rate to
existing judgments, the starting point of analysis is the plain
language of the statute. The language "shall bear interest" is
similar to statutes in other states, but alone is not sufficient
basis for a court to find clear legislative intent regarding retroactive application. As a result, it will be necessary for a reviewing court t o go beyond the language of the statute to determine
whether the new interest rate will apply to a judgment rendered prior to its effective date.
Although Utah courts have not directly addressed this
issue, an argument can be made, based on Utah case law, that
the new interest rate should be applied retroactively t o the
judgment from the date of entry of the judgment. The general
rule in Utah is that amendments t o statutes are not retroactive? However, in accordance with the prevailing view in other states, statutes that are procedural or remedial in nature
are exceptions to the rule prohibiting retroactivity.62"A statute is considered procedural or remedial . . . if the statute does
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights.9263
In Marshall u. Industrial Cornrni~sion,~~
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether t o apply new
amendments to workers' compensation statutes (providing for
the inclusion of interest on awards for benefits) to an award
based on an injury which occurred prior t o the effective date of
the amendments. After considering the general rule of
nonretroactive application of a statute and its exception for
procedural or remedial statutes, the court found:
Interest on a compensation award is incident to a right and a
remedy that already exists. Retroactive application of the
statute does not alter the substance of the compensation
award. Payment of interest on an unpaid benefit neither
creates a new right nor destroys an existing right. Therefore,

61. UTAH CODE ANN. 3 68-3-3 (1993) ("No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.")
62. See, e.g., State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); Department of
Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Utah 1982).
63. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990).
64. 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985).
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interest payments should be made on any benefits awarded
after the effective date of the statute even though the injury
had occurred before.65

This holding, however, applies only to benefits awarded after
the effective date of the statute. As a result, it is unlikely that
a Utah court would apply the newly changed rate retroactively
to prior judgments.
The Utah court would next consider whether the newly
amended statute should apply prospectively-from its effective
date of May 3, 1993-to the pre-existing judgment. No Utah
case law considers whether a judgment is a contract or simply
the result of legislative grace. As a result, the court would have
to consider decisions from other jurisdictions and their underlying rationale t o determine whether, in Utah, a judgment is to
be treated as a contract o r as the result of legislative grace.

Post-judgment interest is a valuable statutory provision
which compensates the judgment creditor for not having the
use of the judgment money during the appeals process. As a
result, all fifty states and the federal government have made
provisions for allowing post-judgment interest. However, because amendments t o these statutes are common, a plethora of
avoidable litigation has resulted. Simple changes suggested in
this comment would result in a decrease in litigation and ensure that post-judgment interest statutes fulfill their purpose
more efficiently and effectively.
Until these changes are made by legislatures, judgment
creditors and debtors alike should be aware of the judicial
treatment of amendments to post-judgment statutes following
entry of a judgment. No court has retroactively applied a n
amended statute t o a prior judgment from the date of judgment; however, the majority of the courts have applied the new
statute to outstanding judgments prospectively from the date
they become effective.

Brian P. Miller

65. Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
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State

Statute

Rate

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

ARK. CODEANN. 5 16-65-114 (Michie

Arkansas

1987).

CAL.CN. PROc. CODEg 685.010
(West 1987).

California

Colorado

Discount rate
2% / year

+

COLO.REV.STAT.$ 13-21-101(1987)
(limited to personal injury cases).
CONN.GEN. STAT.5 50a-59 (Supp.
1994). See also CONN.GEN.STAT.
5 37-3a (Supp. 1994); 37-3b (1987).

Connecticut

Delaware

Fed Reserve
Discount Rate
5%

District of
Columbia

70% of IRS
rate.

+

DEL.CODEANN. tit. 6 g 2301 (1993).

D.C. CODEANN. § 28-3302 (1981).
See also D.C. CODEANN. 5 15-109
(1981).
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Comments

Cases

Conoco, Inc. v. ArnSouth Bank (In re
Norman), 57 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 1984).

No retroactive effect. Interest
a t time of judgment is proper
rate.

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Anderson, 669 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1983).

Bases decision on clear language of statute. Amendment
does not apply retroactively to
judgment previously rendered.

McBride v. Superior Ct., 635 P.2d
178 (Ariz. 1981).

Post-judgment interest i s result
of legislative grace and not contractual obligation. Amended
rate applies to outstanding
judgment from effective date.

Missouri & Ark. Lumber & Mining
Co. v. Sebastian County, 249 U.S.
170 (1919).

Interest is a matter, not of contract, but of legislative discretion, to be changed or ended a t
will of legislature.

-

-

-

-

- -

American National Bank v. Bank of
Peacock, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1206
(1985).
Maurice L. Bein, Inc. v. Housing
Auth., 321 P.2d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958).

Constitutional problems would
arise from retroactive application.
With pre-judgment interest, no
retroactive application given to
amendment.

Butler v. Rockwell, 29 P. 458 (Colo.
1892).

Applies contract theory;
amendment does not apply to
outstanding judgment.

Thomas v. Sugarland Indus., 431
A.2d 1271 (Del. 1981).

Amendment does not apply
retroactively to judgment previously rendered.
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State

Rate

Statute

Florida

12% I year

FLA.STAT.ANN.
5 55.03 (West 1994).

Georgia

12% 1 year

GA. CODEANN.
12 (1989).

Hawaii

10%1 year

HAW.REV.STAT.

5 7-4-

5 478-3 (Supp. 1992).
-

-

-

-

-

Idaho

5% + base rate (weekly avg. yield of U.S.
treasury)

IDAHO CODE 28-22104 (1993).

Illinois

9% 1year

ILL.ANN. STAT.ch.
735, para. 5/12-109
(Smith-Hurd 1992).
ILL.ANN. STAT.ch.
735, para. 5/2-1303
(1992).

Indiana

8%1 year

IND.CODEANN. 5 244.6-1-101 (Burns
Supp. 1994).

Iowa

10%1 year

IOWACODEANN.
5 535.3 (West Supp.
1994).
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Cases
- - --

--

--

-

Glades County v. Kurtz, 101 F.2d
759 (5th Cir. 1939).
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v.
Central Rigging & Contracting
Corp., 684 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.
1982).
Department of Transp. v. Delta
Mach. Prods. Co., 291 S.E.2d 104
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
Camellia Corp. v. Cornell, 291
S.E.2d 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).

McKeague v. Talbert, 658 P.2d 898
(Haw. Ct. App. 1983).

621

Comments
- - --

Amended rate applies from effective date. Post-judgment interest
i s not contractual, but statutory.
1980 amendment increasing from
7% to 12% applied from effective

date to judgments rendered before
the effective date of amendment
but not yet satisfied.
Refuses to apply amended rate to
outstanding judgment.
Follows holding in Department of
Transp. v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co.,
291 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982).
Dicta: amendment cannot be applied retroactively.
--

Desfosses v. Desfosses, 815 P.2d
1094, 1101 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).

Because the cause of action "accrued well before effective date of
the amendment," rate a t time of
judgment was proper rate to apply.

Noe v. City of Chicago, 307 N.E.2d
376 (Ill. 1974).
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R.
v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 55 F.R.D. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Western
Refrigerating Co., 44 N.E. 746 (Ill.
1896).

Amended rate applied from effective date. Post-judgment interest
i s solely the creature of statute.
Dicta: post-judgment interest is
governed by statute not contract.
Amended rate applies from effective date.
Amended rate applied from effective date. Post-judgment interest
i s solely the creature of statute.

Indiana Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co.,
437 N.E.2d 1381, 1391 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982).

"Interest i s recoverable not a s
interest but a s additional damages
to accomplish full compensation.
The statutory interest rate is used
merely a s a measure for the value
of the lost use of the property."

In re Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1982).

Bases decision on clear language
of statute. Amendment does not
apply retroactively to judgment
previously rendered.
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Rate

Statute

Discount rate + 4%
(but depends on year
of judgment)

12% 1 year

Variable depending on
date.

LA. CIV. CODEANN.
art. 2924 (West 1994).

15% I year if Dist. Ct.;
T-bill + 7% if not

ME. REV. STAT.ANN.
tit. 14, 5 1602-A (West
Supp. 1993).

10% 1 year

Mu. CODEANN.,CTS.
& JUD. PRoc. 5 11-107
(1989).

MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 235, 5 8
(West 1986).

12% 1year before
1/1/87, 1% + 5yr Tnotes rate after.
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Cases

Comments

Maxwell v. Redd, 496 P.2d 1320
(Kan. 1972).
Bartlett v. Heersche, 496 P.2d 1314
(Kan. 1972).
Lippert v. Angle, 508 P.2d 920
(1973).

Amendment to pre-judgment interest statute given prospective
application only.
Bases decision on clear language
of statute. Amendment does not
apply retroactively to judgment
previously rendered. (Compelling
dissenting opinion).
Pre-judgment interest. Amendment not given retrospective effect
and doesn't change prior rate of
interest.

Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859
(Ky. 1978).

Post-judgment interest i s matter
of legislative grace, not contractual in nature. Amended rate
applies from effective date of statute.

Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 245
So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1971).

Bases decision on absence of statutory language intending to apply
amendment retroactively. Amendment does not apply retroactively
to judgment previously rendered.

Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp.,
449 A.2d 406 (Md. 1982).

Post-judgment interest i s a matter
of legislative grace, i s not contractual in nature. Change in rate
applies from date of change to all
outstanding judgments.

Trinity Church v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 544 N.E.2d 584
(Mass. 1989).
Shelist v. Boston Redevelopment
Auth., 215 N.E.2d 748 (Mass.
1966).

Amended rate applied from effective date.
Absent clear statutory language,
an amendment which affects substantive rights is not retroactive.
A change in post-judgment interest affects substantive rights.

--

Herring v. Golden State Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 641,646
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982).

Statutes "having a punitive purpose, are never given retroactive
effect." No retroactive application
absent clear legislative intent.
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Statute

Rate
Secondary market
yield on one year Tbill

MINN.STAT.ANN.
$ 549.09 (West Supp.

Rate set by judge

MISS. CODEANN.

1994).
$ 75-17-7 (1972).

9% / year

Mo. ANN. STAT.
$408.040 (Vernon
1990).

10%/ year

NEB. REV. STAT.g 45103 (1988). See also

NEB. REV. STAT.$45103.01 (1988)

Prime rate a t largest
bank + 2%.

NEV. REV. STAT.ANN.
$ 17.130 (Michie
1993).

10% 1 year

N.H. REV. STAT.ANN.
$ 336:l (1984).

prior to 4/1/75 6%;
4/1/75 to 9/13/81 8%;
9/14/81 to l./1/86 12%;
1/2/86 to current
based on state fund

N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11.
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Cases

-

-

-

White v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 602 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).

Senn v. Commerce-Manchester
Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1980).
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Comments

-

Post-judgment interest i s substantive, not procedural right. However, right to post-judgment interest
i s statutory, not contractual in nature. Amended rate applies from
effective date of statute.
Post-judgment interest i s matter
of legislative grace, i s not contractual in nature. Amended rate
applies from effective date of statute.

Stanford v. Coram, 72 P. 655
(Mont. 1903).

A judgment rendered prior to the
date when the amendment to this
section went into effect bore interest of 10% until t h a t date and only
8% thereafter.

Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power Co.,
707 P.2d 1137 (Nev. 1985).

This i s not a post-judgment interest statute, but a computation of
interest statute.
Cause of action arose before
amendment (increasing rate to
12%), interest should have been
awarded a t the lower rate until
judgment satisfied. Not retroactive
where complaint filed prior to any
amendments.

Bhy Trucking, Inc. v. Hicks, 720
P.2d 1229 (Nev. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 994 (1986).
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Rate

Statute

8 314%1 year

N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 568-4 (Michie Supp.
1994).

9% 1 year

N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &
R. 5003 (McKinney
1992). See also N.Y.
CIV.PRAc. L. & R.
5004 (McKinney
1992).

8%1 year

N.C. GENSTAT.5 24-1
(1991).

12%I year

N.D. CENT.CODE

5 28-20-34 (1993).

OHIOREV. CODEANN.
5 1343.03 (Anderson
1993).

10%1 year

-

--

4%+ T-Bill rate at 1st
of year

9%1 year

OKLA.STAT.tit. 12,
$ 727 (1988).

POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES
--

Comments
North v. Public Serv. Co., 680 P.2d
603 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

1983 Amendment applies prospectively.

In re Bronx River Parkway, 20

Applies interest in "takings" case
a t old rate until effective date of
amendment.
Interest on tax refunds. Interest i s
a creature of statute and not of
contract. Amended rate applies
from effective date.
"Takings" case. Amendment does
not impair existing contractual
obligations. Amended rate applies
from effective date.
Once merged into judgment, postjudgment interest i s not a matter
of contract. Legislature may
change a t will.

N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1940).
Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co. v. Miller,
17 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1939).

In re Gillespie, 16 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
Morley v. Lake Shore & Mich. So.
Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892).

EEOC v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 690
F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1982).

Clear legislative language and
intent. Not retroactive.

Swanson v. Flynn, 31 N.W. 2d 320
(N.D. 1948).

Post-judgment interest i s statutory and not contractual in nature.
Amended rate applies to outstanding judgment from effective
date.

Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Koski
Constr. Co., 573 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989)
Tony Zumbo & Son Constr. Co. v.
Transportation Dept., 490 N.E.2d
621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).

Pre-judgment interest. Apply the
rate a t time of judgment.

Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes
Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329 (Okla.
1970).

Bases decision on clear language
of statute. Amendment does not
apply retroactively to judgment
previously rendered.

Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702
F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1983).

Following prior state supreme
court ruling, refused to apply
amended rate to outstanding judgment, but see footnote 9 for suggested "sounder rule."
Pre-judgment interest: allows
amended rate to apply from effective date forward.

-

Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
672 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982).

-

Pre-judgment amended rate applies to outstanding judgment
from effective date.
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Rate
Unable to determine

Statute

PA.STAT.ANN. tit. 42,

5 8101 (1982)
12% / year

R.I. GEN.LAWS5 626-1 (1992).

-

-

14% / year

S.C. CODEANN. 5 3431-20(B) (Law. Co-op.
1987).

10% / year

S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS
ANN. 5 54-3-5.1
(1990); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSANN. 5 54-316(2) (Supp. 1994).

10% 1 year

TENN.CODEANN.
5 47-14-121 (1988).

Discount rate (but,
min of 10% and max
of 20%)

TEXASREV.CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.05
(West Supp. 1994).

Federal post-judgment
interest rate + 2%.

UTAHCODEANN.
5 15-1-4 (SUPP. 1994).

POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST CHANGES
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Cases
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Comments

Carner v. Grist Mill '76 Corp., 645
F. Supp. 331, 337 (D.R.I. 1986).

Pre-judgment interest: 1981
amendment (6% to 12%), was
intended to apply to inchoate obligations previously executed-that
is, to have retrospective effect.

Sears v. Fowler, 358 S.E.2d 574,
575 (S.C. 1987).

"[Plurpose of post-judgment interest is to penalize nonpayment
of a judgment by a judgment debtor."
Post-judgment interest i s matter
of legislative grace, i s not contractual. Amended rate applies to outstanding judgments from effective
date.

Southeastern Freight Lines v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d
860 (S.C. 1983).

-

--

Commissioner of Transp. v.
McDougal, 648 S.W.2d 254 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1983).

Post-judgment interest i s a matter
of statutory grace, not in the form
of contract. Thus, amended rate
applies to outstanding judgment
from effective date.

Manley v. Sammons Enter., Inc.,
563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978).

Amendment does not apply retroactively to judgment previously
rendered.
Bases decision on clear language
of statute. Amendment does not
apply retroactively to judgment
previously rendered.
With little analysis, court refuses
to apply amended rate to outstanding judgment.

Costal Industrial Water Auth. v.
Trinity Portland Cement Div., 563
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1978).
Herron v. Lackey, 556 S.W.2d 246
(Tex. 1977).
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State

I

Statute

Rate
--

12% / year

VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 12,
5 2903 (Supp. 1993).

9% / year

V.I. CODEANN.tit. 5,
§ 426 (Supp. 1994).

9% 1 year

VA. CODEANN. 5 6.1330.54 (Michie 1993).

Higher of 12% / year
or yield of 26 week Tbill + 4%.

WASH.REV.CODE
5 4.56.110 (Supp.
1994) and WASH.REV.
CODE5 19.52.020
(Supp. 1994).

10% / year

W. VA. CODEg 56-631 (Supp. 1994).

Wisconsin

12% / year

WIS. STAT.ANN.
5 815.05(8) (1994).

Wyoming

10%/ year

WYO.STAT.5 1-16-102
(Supp. 1994).

Vermont

I
I

---

Virgin Islands
Virginia

I
I

Washington

West Virginia

1
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Comments

--

Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d
1122 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).

Palmer v. Laberee, 63 P. 216
(Wash. 1900).

Ferris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 292 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980).

Bases decision on clear language
of statute. Amendment does not
apply retroactively to judgment
previously rendered. Dicta: postjudgment interest is not contractual matter, but one of legislative
discretion.
Post-judgment interest i s a matter
of legislative grace, i s not contractual. Amended rate applies from
effective date.

Amended rate applies prospectively from the date of judgment
previously rendered.
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Model Post-Judgment Interest Statute
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear interest agreed upon by the parties.
(2) All other judgments shall bear interest from the date of the judgment
until payment, a t a rate equal to the prime rate a t the largest bank in
STATE on January 1 or July 1, a s the case may be, immediately preceding
the date of the judgment, plus - percent. The rate must be adjusted accordingly on each January 1 and July 1thereafter until the judgment is satisfied.
(3) The post-judgment interest provided for in this section shall be collectable as a part of each judgment whether or not the judgment specifically
reflects the entitlement to such interest.
(4) The provisions of this act apply only to judgments entered on or after

